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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Cette  étude  utilise  une  base  de  données  originale  regroupant  les  conventions  collectives 
couvrant plus de 500 employés signées au Québec ou en Ontario de 1985 `à 2007 et des 
informations sur les taxes sur la masse salariale et d’autres variables, afin de mesurer l’effet 
d’une  augmentation  de  taxe  sur  la  masse  salariale.  Les  résultats  de  ce  modèle  indiquent 
qu’après un an, une augmentation d’un point de pourcentage des taxes générales sur la masse 
salariale fait diminuer la croissance des salaires de 1/2 point de pourcentage au Québec et 3/10 
de point de pourcentage en Ontario.  
 





This study uses an original data set, combining information for all collective agreements 
covering more than 500 employees signed in  Quebec or Ontario from  1985 to 2007 and 
information on payroll taxes and other variables, to measure the incidence of an increase in 
payroll tax. The results of this model show that that after one year, a one percentage point 
increase in the general payroll tax reduces wages growth by 1/2 of a percentage point in 
Quebec and 3/10 of a point in Ontario.   
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to measure the incidence of payroll taxes on wages in order to 
further  our  understanding  of  this  type  of  tax.  This  is  of  interest  since  these  taxes  play  an 
increasing role in financing government spending in Canada; the importance of payroll taxes in 
Canada as a percentage of GDP increased from 1.4% in 1965
1 to 4.9 in 2006
2. Yet the actual 
impact of payroll taxes levied on employers on labour costs, wages and employment is uncertain 
due to the possibility of some shifting of the tax burden. This paper is organized in three parts. 
Part 1 briefly summarizes the relevant literature on the incidence of payroll taxation and presents 
the model used. Part 2 presents the institutional background of payroll taxation in Canada and the 
data used in the study. Part 3 analyzes the results of the estimations. One should note that this 
study uses an original data set containing all collective agreements covering 500 employees or 
more that were signed in Quebec or Ontario during the 1985-2007 period., matched to payroll 
taxes and in particular WCB premiums. 
                                                           
1 Lin, Z., Picot, G. And Beach, C. (1996). 
2 Statistiques des recettes publiques des pays membres de l'OCDE 1965-2007, OCDE, Paris 2008, Tables   
  14 and 39.             1 
1.1 Literature review and model. 
Employers can attempt to shift a payroll tax levied on them to workers by paying them lower 
wages than in the absence of the tax. If they succeed completely in this shifting of the tax, their 
labour costs post and pre tax will remain the same and this will have no effect on their demand 
for labour but may reduce the supply if it is elastic towages. The degree of shifting is an 
empirical issue depending on the relevant characteristics of each and every labour market. We 
thus present five empirical studies of this shifting 
The first econometric study on payroll taxation that we review is by Brittain (1971). This study 
uses the ordinary least square method (OLS) to estimate a cross-sectional regression. The data on 
wages and employment come from manufacturing censuses for 1958, but the author also adds 
any other census in the period of 1957 to 1959. The data set contains 64 countries and up to 12 
different  industries  which  gives  a  total  of  407  observations.  The  effective  tax  rates  were 
estimated from the statutory rates, which are set in each country by the government. Various 
dependent variables are used. The author finds an incidence of -1.14 to -1.60 depending on the 
dependent  variable  used.  These  coefficients  are  not  significantly  different  from  one.  The 
conclusion of the author is that for a given level of productivity in a country, an increase in 
payroll taxes lowers mean nominal wages by the exact amount of the tax. Thus this study finds 
evidence of backward shifting of the payroll tax through lower wages for workers. 
The second econometric study we review is by Holmlund (1983). This study uses a data set for 
Sweden in which wage rates refer to average hourly earnings for adult blue-collar male who 
work in mining and manufacturing. The author constructs an aggregate wage measure adjusted 
for inter-industry employment shifts and excluding overtime premiums for the period of 1949 to 
1979. 
The author uses OLS and two-stages least squares (2SLS) time series regression to measure the 
incidence of payroll taxes on wages. This study obtains an incidence of payroll taxation of -0.492 
for the simple OLS regression and -0.462 for the 2SLS regression. Thus, the findings suggest 
that only a fraction of payroll tax increase were directly shifted back to workers as lower wages.  
These results rely on a time span of 1 year which limits the measured incidence to the short-term 
effects of a payroll tax increase; it is possible that the long-term incidence also falls on labour, 2 
despite the fact that the short-run analysis suggests partial backward shifting to workers as lower 
wages.  Moreover,  these  results  also  suggest  the  presence  of  a  significant  incidence  on 
employment in the short-run.  
The third econometric study reviewed here is that of Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) which 
draws  on  Marceau  (1988)
3.  The  study  uses  panel  data  for  large  (500  employees  and  over) 
individual collective agreements in Quebec (Canada) as collected by Labour Canada during the 
period of 1975 to 1984. The authors estimate a wage determination equation with the (OLS) 
pooled regression method. The paper finds that the rate of change in the sum of the general 
payroll taxes has an impact on wages between -0.247 and -0.0389 while the rate of change in the 
firm-specific payroll tax has an impact of 0.0266 or 0.0260. The authors also tried to aggregate 
the two types of taxes, but the payroll tax coefficients are not significant. The main conclusion of 
this paper is that previous research on payroll taxes arrived to a wide range of estimates which 
sometime  seemed  incompatible  because  they  did  not  distinguish  general  from  firm-specific 
payroll tax. The model that was used in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) will be the model used 
in this paper. 
The  fourth  econometric  study  reviewed  is  by  Gruber  (1997).  This  study  takes  advantage  of 
Chile’s privatization of the social security system in 1981 (a natural experiment) which led to an 
important reduction in the payroll tax to measure the incidence of payroll taxation in Chile. This 
study uses data from a survey of all Chilean manufacturing plants which counted more than ten 
employees over the period of 1979-1986 (1979, 1980, 1984 and 1985 data are used).The author 
creates payroll tax rates for each firm by dividing total tax payments by wages. The author 
estimates four different regressions: the incidence of a 1 percentage point decrease in payroll tax 
varies from 1.022 to 1,561 %. Hence the reduction of payroll tax rates on firms increased the 
wages by the amount of the tax which suggests full backward-shifting. 
The last econometric study reviewed here is by Krugler and Krugler (2008). It paper uses a 
balanced panel of plants from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers in Colombia over the period 
1982-1996.  Without  controlling for sector-specific effects,  a 1% increase in  payroll  tax rate 
                                                           
3 Marceau, N. (1988), Incidence à court terme sur les salaires de la croissance des taxes sur la masse salariale, M. Sc. 
(Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec). 3 
reduces wages by 0,142%; controlling for sector specific trends the impact is 0,187% while when 
controlling for plant-specific the effect is 0,235%. Thus the results of this study imply partial 
backward shifting. The authors argue that this “less-than-full-shifting” could be explained by the 
weak linkages between benefits and taxes and the downward wage rigidities which characterise 
the Colombian labour market. 
We summarize these five studies in table 1. 
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Table 1  
Summary of the studies reviewed  
 
Author(s) and year Subject Variables Data Estimation Method Results
Brittain (1971) Econometric study of the incidence 
of payroll taxation an inter-country 
apporch.
Dependent variable:                                           
1) Value-added per labour input.                             
2) Wage.                                              
Independent variables:                                                  
1)Wage and -Log(1+taxe).                                           
2) Value-added per labour input and - 
log(1+taxe).                                                                            
Dichotomous variables:                          
Industries.
The data on wages and employment come 
from manufacturing censuses for 1958, 
while some additional observations came 
from the 1957 and 1959 census.                                                     
The data set contains 407 observations on 
64 countries.                                                                                                                              
Payroll taxes:                                              
The effective tax rates were estimated from 
the statutory rates. The general and specific 
taxes were aggregated.                                                       
This study uses the ordinary least 
square method (OLS) to estimate 
a cross-sectional regression of 
aggregative data among different 
countries. This approach gives 
the long-run incidence of a 
payroll tax on wages. 
Incidence of -1,14 to -1,60 which in 
not significantly different from a 
coefficient of unity. For a given level 
of productivity in a country, an 
increase in payroll taxes lowers mean 
wages for workers by the exact amount 
of the tax.                                                          
(This study finds full Shifing).
Holmlund, B. (1983) This study adopts a short term 
approach, time span of 1 year, to 
analyse the postwar incidence of the  
payroll taxes increase on wages in 
Sweden.
Dependent variable:                                        
1) First difference of Log (wage).                                                                                       
Independent variables:                                    
Log of 1 + the payroll tax rate , log of 1 
minus the average income tax rate, log index 
of volume of production divided by the 
output trend, log of the current and lagged 
one year producer price index for industrial 
products (PPI and PPI-1) and the log of the 
consumer price index (CPI).                            
This study uses a data set in which wage 
rates refer to average hourly earnings for 
adult blue-collar male who work in mining 
and manufacturing. The author constructed 
a new aggregate wage measure adjusted for 
inter-industry employment shifts and 
excluding overtime premiums.                                       
The number of observations in the data set 
is not available in the paper.                                
Payroll taxes:                                                
The general and specific taxes were 
aggregated. The statutory payroll tax rates 
were used.
1) OLS time series regression.                      
2)2SLS time series regression 
where the current producer price 
index (PPI) was instrumented.
This study measures an incidence of 
payroll taxation of -0.492 for the 
simple OLS regression and -0.462 for 
the 2SLS regression.      Thus, the 
findings suggest that only a fraction of 
payroll tax increase were directly 
shifted back to workers as lower 
wages.                     (This study finds 
partial Shifing).                         
Vaillancourt and Marceau 
(1990)
This study uses Canadian panel data 
to measure the incidence of general 
and specific payroll taxes. 
Dependent variable:                                        
The negotiated rate of growth of base wages.                                                         
Independent variables:                                    
The rate of change of general payroll taxes 
and specific payroll taxes, the average 
vacancy rates, the rate of change in the 
consumer price index (CPI).                                                  
Dichotomous variables:                                      
A a dichotomous variable which indicates 
the presence of cost of living agreement 
clause (COLA), dichotomous variables for 
industries and a dichotomous variable for 
wage controls.
The study uses panel data for large (500 
employees and over) individual collective 
agreements in Quebec as collected by 
Labour Canada (1975-1984).                                                                  
The data set contains 780 observations on 
the collective agreements signed in Quebec 
during the period.                                                                                             
Payroll taxes:                                               
UI, Q.P.P, CNT, HSF, CSST.    The 
general and specific taxes were 
incorporated separetely in the model. They 
impute the average payroll tax rates based 
on the province and the sector of the 
business.
The authors estimate a wage
determination equation for the
province of Quebec with the
(OLS) pooled regression method. 
The general taxes had a negative
impact on the negotiated rate of
growth of base wages, while the
specific taxes had a positive impact.
Previous research on payroll taxes
arrived to a wide range of estimates,
which could be explain by the failure
of the previous studies to distinguish
general taxes from specific taxes.
(This study finds partial Shifing).  
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Gruber (1997) This study takes advantage of 
Chile’s experience before and after 
the privatization of its social 
security system which led to an 
important exogenous reduction in 
the payroll tax burden on Chilean 
firms, to estimate the impact of 
payroll taxation.
Dependent variable:                                        
1) First difference of Log (wage).                                                         
2) First difference of Log (employment).                                     
Independent variables:                                    
The difference of the constructed tax rates.                                                                 
Dichotomous variables:                                     
Time dummies and  dummy for workers 
group.
Survey of all Chilean manufacturing plants 
which counted more than ten employees 
over the 1979-1986 period. This data set 
has information on total wages, 
employment and payroll taxes paid, 
information on blue and white collar 
workers.                                                            
The data set contains 6066 observations on 
the wages of Chilean firms.                                                         
Payroll taxes:                                                 
The general and specific taxes were 
aggregated. They use firm-level data on 
total wage to construct the tax rates.             
1) Basic difference pooled 
regression (OLS).                                 
2) Basic difference pooled 
regression with plant effect 
(OLS).                                                                    
3) Basic difference pooled 
regression with instrumental 
variable for group payroll taxe 
(IV).                                                             
4) Basic difference pooled 
regression with area and 
industries as a grouping of 
instrumental variables (IV).
Results Reg 1) -1,20 on wages and no 
effect on employment.                                                   
Results Reg 2) -1,022 on wages and 
no effect on employment.                                            
Results Reg 3) -1,412 on wages and 
no effect on employment.                                       
Results Reg 4) -1,561 on wages and 
no effect on employment.                                                               
The privatisation of Chile social 
insurance system which led in a 
reduction of payroll tax rates on firms 
increased the wages by the amount of 
the tax and had no effect on 
employment.                                             
(This study finds full Shifing).  
Kugler and Kugler (2008) This paper uses a panel of 
manufacturing plants from 
Colombia to estimate how the rise in 
payroll tax rates over the 1980s and 
1990s affected wages and 
employment.
Dependent variable:                                         
The difference of total wages per employees.                                              
Independent variables:                           
The constructed tax rates (total wages / 
employees), sector effects and plant effects.                                                                                                                
Dichotomous variables:                                      
Variable for production jobs and years.
The study uses a balanced panel of plants 
in the formal sector from the Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers in Colombia over 
the period 1982-1996. The data set 
contains information on total contributions, 
wages and employment.                                                       
The data set contains 470 observations on 
the wages of Colombian firms.                                              
Payroll taxes:                                                      
The general and specific taxes were 
aggregated. They use firm-level data on 
total wage to construct the tax rates.             
This study uses the ordinary least 
square panel regression method 
(OLS) to estimate a balanced 
panel regression in first 
differance.
Without controlling for sector-specific 
effects suggest that a 1% increase in 
payroll tax rate reduces wages by 
0,142% and employment by 0,273%. 
Controlling for sector specific trends 
gives larger effects on both wages and 
employment. The results suggest that a 
1% increase in the payroll tax rate 
reduces wages by 0,187% and 
employment by 0,305%. With plant-
specific trends result suggest that a 1% 
increase in the payroll tax rate reduces 
wages by 0,235% and employment by 
0,384%.                                 (This 
study finds partial Shifing).  
 
Sources:  
-Brittain, J.A. (1971), “The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp.110-125. 
-Holmlund, B. (1983), “Payroll Taxes and Wage Inflation: The Swedish Experience”, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp.1-15. 
-Vaillancourt, F. and Marceau, N. (1990), “Do general and firm-specific employer payroll taxes have the same incidence? Theory and evidence”, Economics    
  Letters, No. 34, pp. 175-181.Gruber, J. (1997), “The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile”, Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp.   
  S72-S101. 
-Gruber, J. (1997), “The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile”, Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. S72-S101. 
-Krugler, A. and Krugler, M (2008), “Labour Market Effects of Payroll Taxes in Developing Countries: Evidence from Colombia”, NBER, Working Paper 
 13855.  
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1.2The model 
 The model used in this research is the standard wage equation augmented by the tax variables, 
which was used in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990).
4 In this paper we estimate an equation 
which  is  similar  to  the  one  used  in  Vaillancourt  and  Marceau  (1990),using  however  the 
unemployment rate as opposed to the vacancy rate since that data are not available for the full 
period we examine. Thus, the equation estimated is; 
Wi = β0 + β1GPTi + β2FSPTji + β3CPIi + β4COLA + β5 Unemploymenti + Σj=6 βjIndustryi. 
We expect the negotiated rate of growth in wage to: 
  decrease with an increase in general payroll tax (β1 < 0);  
  decrease or increase with an increase in firm-specific payroll taxes (β2 =?) 
   increase with an increase in prices as measured by the average annual inflation of the two 
previous quarters (β3 > 0); 
   be lower with the presence of a Cost Of Living Adjustment clause (β4 < 0) since the 
collective agreement then provides protection against unexpected inflation; 
   decrease with an increase in the unemployment rate (β5’< 0);  
  vary between industries to reflect various industry specific factors such as the strength of 
unions.  
 
We present the variables in detail in the next part of the paper 
 
                                                           
4 Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990, 178). 7 
2. Payroll taxes and data. 
 
In  this  section  the  relevant  Canadian  payroll  taxes  are  presented  and  the  data  used  in  the 
estimations summarized. 
2.1 Canadian payroll taxes  
Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the seven relevant payroll taxes.  
Table 2 
 
Payroll Taxes in Canada 
Type of Tax  Government Level  Who pays  Rate (%) 
2007               
QC 
Rate (%) 






58% Employers and 
42% Employees  2.04  2,52 
Canada/Quebec Pension 
Plan (C/QPP) 
Federal and Quebec 
(1966) 
50% Employers and 
50% Employees  9,9  9,9 
Workers Compensation             
(WCB) 
All Provinces (1910+)  100% Employers 
2,24*  2,26* 
Health-Education Payroll 
Taxes (H/E) 
Quebec (1970), Manitoba 
(1982), Newfoudland 
(1990), Ontario (1990) 
100% Employers 
4,26  1,95 
Labour Standards (CNT)  Quebec (1979)  100% Employers  0,08  NA 
Quebec Parental Insurance 
Plan (QPIP) 
Quebec (2006)  58% Employers and 
42% Employees  0,583  NA 
Employer Training Tax  Quebec (1995)  100% Employers  1,00  NA 
 
Source: Bédard, M. (1998), “A Primer on Payroll Taxes in Canada”, Applied Research Branch  
Strategic Policy Human Resources Development Canada, R-98-7E, p10. 
All rates are statutory except for the WCB  ones which are the observed average NA Not Applicable 
The date in ( ) is the date a program was introduced.  All tax rates are set annually ;the CPP/QPP rate has 
been stable since 2000 and the employer training tax one since 1995 8 
The following points are worth noting with respect to the content of Table 2: 
 
  The unemployment insurance rate is not the same in Québec as in the rest of Canada 
since that province operates a distinct parental (leave) insurance plan. Hence the federal 
EI rate is reduced in Québec, leaving room for the payroll tax that finances the Québec 
plan; 
  The federal Canada pension plan (for workers outside Québec) and its equivalent, the 
Québec pension plan, have contribution rates that are set independently but are in practice 
always equal; 
  The WCB rates are set at the level of the sector taking into account at least partially 
experience rating; 
  The  health  and  education  provincial  payroll  taxes  are  general  payroll  taxes  with  no 
earmarking of funds;   
  The employer training tax is only levied by the government of Quebec on employers who 
do not provide training for their workers, the amount spent must exceed 1% of the total 
payroll in order to avoid the tax.  
 
2.2 The data  
We now present the variables used in the model
5 
Dependant variable W 
It  is  the  negotiated  rate  of  wage  growth  for  all  collective  agreements  with  more  than  500 
employees, which were signed in Quebec or Ontario during the period of 1985 to 2007. The data 
on  the  collective  agreements  were  collected  by  Human  Resources  and  Skills  Development 
Canada. Figure1 presents the evolution of wage growth in Canada for the 1985-2007 period. The 
negotiated wage growth is higher for the collective agreements without cost of living clauses. 
                                                           
5 Additional information is found in the appendix. 9 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Authors; COLA= Cost of Living Adjustment clause in collective agreement 
Payroll taxes GPT, GPTB, GPTNB and FPST 
We use either one or a combination of two variables for non firm specific payroll taxes. They 
are: 
General payroll tax GPT= sum of the UI, CPP or QPP, HE, CNT and QPIP. 
General payroll tax with benefits GPTB(1) = CPP or QPP; 
General payroll tax without benefits GPTNB(1) = sum of UI, HE, CNT and QPIP; 
General payroll tax with benefits GPTB(2) = sum of CPP or QPP and UI; 
General payroll tax without benefits GPTNB(2) =sum of HE, CNT and QPIP; 
Firm-specific  payroll  taxes  FSPT=  workers  compensation  premium  by  sector  of  activity. 
Average rates for the period are presented in an appendix table; they vary substantially between 
sectors. 
The data on the UI, CPP, QPP, HE, CNT and QPIP were collected from published sources.
6 The 
workers  compensation  premiums  of  Quebec  and  Ontario  were  provided  by  the  provincial 
                                                           
6 Treff and Perry (1985-2007). 10 
workers compensation board (CSST and WSIB respectively) in a format allowing us to mach it 
to the wage data. 
The employer training tax is excluded from the analysis for lack of data. We note that 91% of the 
employers which were subject to this tax in the period of 2000-2003 invested in employees 
training, 76% of the employers who invested in employee training invested more than 1% while 


























































































Total payroll taxes in Quebec and Ontario 1978-2007
Total payroll taxes 
Quebec
Total payroll taxes 
Ontario
 
Source: calculations by the authors 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the total payroll taxes in Quebec and in Ontario for a period of 
time of 29 years. It shows a positive trend in the total employer payroll taxes in both provinces, 
with higher taxes in Québec. 
Inflation CPI 
The variable CPI is the average annual inflation in each province observed two quarters before 
the collective agreement was signed. 
Cost of Living Adjustment COLA 
                                                           
7 http://emploiquebec.net/publications/pdf/00_fnfmo_rapport20002005.pdf 11 
The variable COLA indicates the presence (1) or not (0) of an indexation clause in the collective 
agreement 
Unemployment 
The variable unemployment is the average unemployment rate in each province two quarters 
before the collective agreement. 
Industry 
We include 18 industrial dichotomous variables. Food and beverages is the reference industry. 
The list of sector is found in the appendix table where WCB rates are presented 
 Figure 3 shows that both inflation and unemployment reach their peaks in the early 90s in 





                                                           
8 The Graphic 3 is based on the following two sources: 
1)  Statistics Canada (2009), Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by sex and detailed age group, unadjusted 
for seasonality, monthly (persons unless otherwise noted), 1985-2003, Unemployment rate and the labour 
force, Quebec and Ontario, Table 282-0001. 
2)  Statistics Canada (2009), Consumer price index (CPI), 2005 basket, monthly (2002=100  
unless otherwise noted), 1985-2007, Quebec and Ontario, Table 326-0020. 
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3. Results 
We present the key results found in Roy- César (2009) for Québec and Ontario in table 3.  
Table 3 Determinants of wage growth, Ontario and Québec, 1985-2007, three definitions of 
general payroll taxes,  
Negotiated wage growth as 









Ontario                  
(5) 
Ontario            
(6) 
General Payroll taxes used  GPT  GPTB1  GPTB2  GPT  GPTB1  GPTB2 
Constant  11,224  11,136  10,074  7,000  6,884  8,410 
  (10,17)  (12,09)  (10,85)  (8,71)  (9,52)  (7,52) 
             
General payroll tax  -0,515  --  --  -0,296  --  -- 
  (7,85)      (5,94)     
             
General payroll tax with 
benefits 
__ 
-0,393  -0,804 
__ 
-0,202  -0,510 
    (5,76)  (5,10)    (3,32)  (3,85) 
             
General payroll tax without 
benefits 
__ 
-0,772  0,079 
__ 
-0,506  -0,162 
    (6,67)  (0,22)    (6,28)  (1,08) 
             
Firm-specific payroll tax  0,062  0,048  0,030  0,227  0,209  0,140 
  (1,72)  (1,36)  (0,83)  (5,76)  (4,80)  (3,26) 
             
Inflation in the CPI  0,186  0,142  0,168  0,164  0,084  0,081 
  (4,70)  (3,62)  (4,08)  (2,42)  (1,21)  (1,23) 
             
Cost of living agreements  -0,676  -0,690  -0,698  -0,902  -0,908  -0,356 
  (4,91)  (5,03)  (5,05)  (4,87)  (4,85)  (8,46) 
             
Unemployment  -0,206  -0,149  -0,230  -0,296  -0,248  -0,938 
  (6,25)  (3,17)  (6,94)  (8,10)  (5,86)  (5,09) 
             
R
2   0,409  0,428  0,426  0,451  0,459  0,457 
N  581  581  581  581  1291  1291 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. Eicker-White robust standard errors were used to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. 
Columns 1 and 4 present results for Québec and Ontario using a single general payroll taxes; 
columns 2 and 5 use one definition of general payroll taxes with benefits and columns 3 and 6 a 14 
slightly more inclusive one. We do not include the results for the 18 sectors; they are available in 
Roy-César (2009) 
Examining first the control variables we find that: 
  An increase in inflation(CPI) increases the growth of wages, significantly so in four  out 
of six equations; 
  The presence of a cost-of-living adjustment clause reduces the negotiated rate of wage 
growth significantly so in all six equations. There is a trade-off between a guaranteed 
wage increase and protection against inflation; 
  An increase in the unemployment rate reduces the growth of waged significantly so in all 
six equations. 
So the three non sectoral control variables have their expected signs. Turning to the payroll taxes 
variables we find that: 
  When we use a single measure of general payroll tax, we obtain a significant negative 
impact on wage growth with shifting of the order of 50% in Québec and 30% in Ontario; 
  When we breakdown the general payroll taxes into benefits linked or not, we find using a 
narrow definition of benefits payroll tax(CPP/QPP) a smaller shifting of benefits linked 
payroll taxes than of non benefits linked ones, with all coefficients significant.  But when 
we enlarge the notion of benefits to include unemployment coverage, this relationship no 
longer holds, that said, most coefficients are negative and significant, showing shifting of 
payroll taxes; 
  Finally, an increase in firm specific payroll taxes, which represent an increase in the risk 
of a workplace accident, increases the rate of growth of wages, but significantly only in 
Ontario. 
 
These findings are pretty similar to those obtained in Holmlund (1983), who used time series 
regression and found incidence of -0.462 and -0.492 after 1 year. They are also in agreement 
with those of Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990). 15 
Conclusion 
In this paper we use wage growth data from the collective agreements which covered more than 
500 employees and were signed in Quebec or Ontario for the period of 1985-2007 to measure the 
incidence of payroll taxation in Canada. The results show that a one percentage point increase in 
general payroll tax reduces annualized wages growth by 1/2 of a percentage point in Quebec and 
3/10 of a point in Ontario.
9 The estimations are similar to other estimations of the short-term 
incidence of general payroll tax found in the literature. Moreover, the results show that firm-
specific payroll tax have a positive but not always significant impact on wages growth, which 
suggests that the upward pressure due to the need of a risk premium exceed the downward 
pressure on wage due to the firm-specific tax increase. These results suggest that in the short-
term, an increase in general payroll tax has a negative impact on wage growth and since this 
impact  is  less  than  the  amount  of  the  tax  these  results  also  suggest  a  negative  impact  on 
employment. 
These results were obtained for large employers. It would be useful to see if they hold for small 
ones. Given that employees in small firms are less likely to be unionized and thus have less 
bargaining power while their employers are more likely to be price takers than large firms, we 
would expect shifting to be even more pronounced in that setting.  
                                                           
9 We find similar results when the tax variables are lagged two years instead of one year, and for that  
    reason we only report the impact of an increase in payroll tax after one year. 16 
Appendix Tables 
Variables definition and sources 
Variables   Definition   Source 
W  The negotiated grown in base wage   Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada 
GPT             
(level) 
The  sum  of  the  general  payroll  taxes  = 
UI+CPP+HE+CNT (level) 
Finances  of  the  Nation  - 
(1985-2007) 
FSPT              
(level) 
The  sum  of  the  firm-specific  payroll  taxes  =  WC 
(level) 
CSST                    
CPI  The average annualized inflation two quarters before 
the collective agreement 
Statistics  Canada  web  site                    
(CANSIM 326-0020). 
COLA  Dichotomous  that  =  1  if  there  is  a  Cost  of  living 
agreement clause in the collective agreement and = 0 
otherwise. 
Idem W 
Unemployment  The average unemployment rate two quarters before 
the collective agreement 
Statistics  Canada  web  site 
(CANSIM 282-0001). 
 
Mean WCB rate(unweighted) by sector 
 
Industries  Québec  Ontario 
Food and beverages   6,35  3,87 
Construction  18,45  7,89 
Textile, clothing and leather  3,41  4,10 
Wood products, paper and printing  8,46  2,27 
Petroleum, coal and chemical products  1,97  1,40 
Plastics and rubber products  4,08  4,26 
Non-metallic mineral products  5,68  3,30 
Primary metals  4,55  5,81 
Metal products  3,65  3,87 
Machinery  5,76  3,99 
Computer and electronic  0,89  1,61 
Electrical equipment and appliances  0,89  4,56 
Transportation equipment  3,46  4,56 
Wholesaler and distributors  2,53  2,01 
Grocery stores  2,53  2,02 
Transports  12,32  5,47 
Broadcasting and telecommunications  0,66  0,68 
Administrative and support services  0,55  3,80 
Accomodation services  2,90  3,09 
Total *  5,04  3,56 17 
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